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Most contributions in axiomatic bargaining are phrased in the space of utilities.
This comes in sharp contrast with standards in most other branches of economic
theory. The present paper shows how Nash’s original axiomatic system can be
rephrased in a natural class of economic environments with lotteries, and how
his uniqueness result can be recovered, provided one completes the system with a
property of independence with respect to preferences over unfeasible alternatives.
A similar result can be derived for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution if and only if
bargaining may involve multiple goods. The paper also introduces a distinction
between welfarism and cardinal welfarism, and emphasizes that the Nash solution
is ordinally invariant on the class of von Neumann-Morgensterm preferences.
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11. INTRODUCTION
Nash’s (1950) bargaining model and the solution he derived axiomatically have had a
great impact on economic theory. Yet his contribution is at odd with the major trend of
the ﬁeld in the second half of the twentieth century because his arguments are phrased
in the space of utilities. The standard, instead, has been to work with more primitive
concepts such as strategies, economic or social outcomes, and the participants’ prefer-
ences. The present paper shows how Nash’s theory can be rephrased to meet these
modern standards in a model where agents can choose lotteries over simple economic
outcomes, while evaluating those lotteries with ordinal von Neumann-Morgenstern pref-
erences (which, of course, are also a cornerstone of non-cooperative game theory and
information economics).
Following Nash, a bargaining problem is a couple (U,d), where U is a compact convex
subset of R2 that represents the set of utility pairs that are achievable through coop-
eration, and d ∈ U is the utility pair that prevails in case of disagreement. A solution
associates a feasible utility pair to each bargaining problem. Nash proved that there exists
a unique solution that satisﬁes the properties of Eﬃciency, Symmetry, Scale Covariance,
and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). It is obtained by maximizing over U
the product of the participants’ utility gains compared to d. A large literature ensued,
some papers establishing alternative characterizations of the Nash bargaining solution,
other introducing alternative axioms to characterize new solutions (see Thomson (1994)
for a survey).
A bargaining problem in this sense is simply a representation of the underlying eco-
nomic or social problem via some utility functions that encode the bargainers’ preferences.
As pointed out by Nash himself, the convexity of U follows from the idea that bargain-
ers can agree on lotteries over basic outcomes, provided one restricts attention to utility
functions that are linear in probabilities. Of course, there is no loss of generality in rep-
resenting the options available to the bargainers and the ﬁnal agreement in the space
of utilities. One is also free to use linear utility functions if the bargainers have von
Neumann-Morgenstern preferences. On the other hand, restricting bargaining solutions
to take convex utility possibility sets as argument, instead of the underlying economic or
social environments, is a signiﬁcant assumption. Indeed, it presupposes that the image
of the economic or social problems through linear representations of the bargainers’ von
Neumann-Morgenstern preferences is suﬃciently informative to determine the solution.
I will call this a property of ‘Cardinal Welfarism’ (C-WELF). It is related to the notion
of welfarism introduced by Roemer (1986; 1988), except that it emphasizes in addition
2the key role that linear representations play in Nash’s theory.1
C-WELF is not appealing as a postulate, because it is hard to understand what
it entails in terms of the primitives, namely the set of available agreements and the
bargainers’ preferences. As an illustration, consider the ﬁve following simple problems.
They will be constructed on diﬀerent sets of economic outcomes, two of which being
represented in Figure 1.2 Each point on the graph speciﬁes the monetary proﬁt that
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both bargainers will receive if they agree on that option, while they receive nothing in case
of disagreement. In the ﬁrst problem, the two bargainers can agree on any lottery over
O1, and are expected utility maximizers with Bernoulli function u(m) = m (risk-neutral).
In the second problem, the two bargainers can agree on any lottery over O2, and are
expected utility maximizers with Bernoulli functions u1(m) = m/4 and u2(m) = m (same
preferences as before, but with a diﬀerent utility representation for the ﬁrst bargainer). In
the third problem, the two bargainers can agree on any lottery over O1, and are expected
utility maximizers with Bernoulli functions u1(m) = m2/4 (risk-loving) and u2 being a
concave function such that u2(0) = 0, u2(1) = 7/4, u2(2) = 3, u2(3) = 15/4, and u2(4) = 4
(risk-averse). In the fourth problem, the two bargainers can agree on any lottery over O2,
and are expected utility maximizers with Bernoulli functions u1(m) =
√
m (risk-averse)
and u2(m) = m (risk-neutral). In the ﬁfth problem, the two bargainers must allocate
four apples and four bananas (without cutting the fruits, but perhaps using a lottery),
with Bernoulli functions u1(x1,x2) = (x1 + x2)/2 and u2(x1,x2) =
√
x1x2, where x1 is a
1C-WELF, on the other hand, is diﬀerent from Sen’s (1977, 1979) notion of Welfarism in social choice
theory - see the discussion of the axiom of ‘exhaustivity’ in Section 3.
2The examples of the Introduction involve problems with a ﬁnite set of outcomes. The axiomatic
results in the main text hold indeed on that class of problems, but also on the larger class of problems
constructed over any compact set.
3quantity of apples and x2 is a quantity of bananas. These ﬁve problems (to list only a
few) are very diﬀerent in their economic description, but they happen to have the same
image in the space of utilities. The resulting agreements must thus be related (in the
sense of coinciding in utilities) in Nash’s cardinal welfarist framework. I do not argue
that a solution that satisﬁes this property is necessarily unappealing. On the other hand,
there is no straightforward argument in its favor, and it is diﬃcult to fully grasp what it
entails. This is why C-WELF should not be accepted as a postulate.
Pushing the reasoning further, observe that conducting the analysis of bargaining
problems in the space of utilities, that is assuming C-WELF a priori, is at best confusing
and at worst misleading, because it creates a mismatch between the axioms’ interpretation
and their real content. The ﬁrst bargaining problem described in the previous paragraph
is clearly symmetric. Assuming that both bargainers have equal bargaining abilities, it
is reasonable to anticipate that they will agree on a contract that gives $2 to each of
them (or a lottery that leaves them indiﬀerent to that contract). This is consistent with
the usual interpretation of Nash’s symmetry axiom. Notice that the four other problems
are also symmetric in Nash’s sense (indeed they all have the same image in the utility
space), but there is no clear relation between the players’ bargaining positions in their
economic description. A similar point can be made for his axioms of scale covariance
and IIA. The information retained when representing bargaining problems in the space
of utilities is just too scarce to determine whether what looks like a scale transformation,
or a reduction in the set of available contracts is not actually obtained by considering
completely unrelated problems.
Nash’s theory seems to be build on some cardinal notion of utilities. Indeed, his solu-
tion is at best scale covariant in his model, and the convexity of the sets of feasible utilities
is justiﬁed only when applying linear utility functions. Nash’s appeal to von Neumann-
Morgenstern’s expected utiltiy theory to justify these assumptions is slightly misleading.
Indeed, while traditional axioms guarantee the existence of linear representations, a pref-
erence relation in that theory is an ordinal concept. von Neumann and Morgenstern’s
and subsequent arguments do not favor linear over any other form of representation: any
increasing transformation of a linear representation of a von Neumann-Morgenstern pref-
erence is another valid representation of the same ordering, though usually not linear.
One comes to wonder then whether the axiomatic justiﬁcation behind the Nash bargain-
ing solution relies crucially on the possibility of measuring intensities of preferences. It
does seem so in a welfarist context. Indeed, we know since Shapley (1969) that it is
impossible to ﬁnd a solution in the space of utilities that is eﬃcient, strictly individually
4rational, and ordinally invariant (Theorem 3 in Section 5 below will make a similar point
in my speciﬁc model). Therefore, if one believes in welfarism (which is required to accept
Nash’ theory in its original and since then standard formulation), then one must neces-
sarily rely on other theories of preferences that are not ordinally invariant. While there
are some interesting theoretical foundations of utility functions that are truly cardinal
in that sense (see chapter 6 of Fishburn, 1970, for a survey), the consensus so far in
mainstream Economics is that they have no practical meaning because they cannot be
deduced by observing individual choices.
On the other hand, I already argued that welfarism is not appealing as a postulate.
So I propose to re-phrase Nash’s ideas in an explicit economic environment, allowing
(selﬁsh) bargainers with von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences to agree on lotteries. As
expected, numerous non-welfarist solutions also satisfy his axioms in that setting (see
Example 1, for instance). One of the main contributions of the present paper is to
show that all these alternative solutions violate a simple property of independence with
respect to preferences between unfeasible alternatives (IPUA). This provides an axiomatic
justiﬁcation for the Nash bargaining solution that is based on the ordinal concept of von
Neumann-Morgenstern preferences, the use of linear representations coming now as a
consequence of the axioms, instead of being a prerequisite. The result also deepens our
understanding of the Nash bargaining solution, IPUA being logically weaker, and more
straightforward to understand than C-WELF (see Section 5).
As hinted by its name, IPUA requires that the solution of two problems that diﬀer
only in the bargainers’ perferences over outcomes that are not feasible coincide. Inter-
estingly the axiom is not really new, but I believe it is the ﬁrst time that it is explicitly
applied to bargaining environments with lotteries. As far as I can tell, the ﬁrst men-
tion of a similar property can be found in Karni and Schmeidler (1975).3 They show
its close relation (together with IIA) to the maximization of a social welfare ordering
that satisﬁes Arrow’s independence property. This type of independence property has
been rather often invoked in the social choice literature since then.4 Other authors im-
pose IPUA implicitly by deﬁning a bargaining problem as a set of outcomes, and von
Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over feasible lotteries (see e.g. Rubinstein et al., 1992;
Valenciano and Zarzuelo, 1997). Notice also that any solution that coincides with the
3Karni and Schmeidler themselves refer to a 1969 mimeo written by A. Gibbard.
4Here are some relevant references: Plott (1976), Grether and Plott (1982), Campbell (1992), Dutta et
al. (2001), Ehlers and Weymark (2003), Fleurbaey (2003), Chambers (2005), Fleurbaey and Tadenuma
(2007), and de Clippel and Bejan (2009). The list aims at illustrating various formulations of the same
idea, and various contexts where the property has been applied, but it is far from being exhaustive.
5subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium outcome of some non-cooperative bargaining proce-
dure whose outcomes involve only feasible agreements,5 must necessarily satisfy IPUA.
Solutions that can be derived via the Nash program must thus satisfy IPUA.6 While
IPUA may thus seem completely innocuous, I must also emphasize what it entails so
that the reader can decide whether he/she ﬁnds it acceptable. One key consequence is
that the bargainers’ risk attitudes play no role in determining the solution of elementary
problems where the bargainers can agree on lotteries over only three outcomes of the
form (0,0), (x,0), and (0,y), with x and y being economic bundles.7 Indeed, there is
only one possible preference relation when comparing lotteries over two bundles (0 and
x for the ﬁrst bargainer, and 0 and y for the second bargainer), where more probability
on the most-preferred bundle is always better.
Roemer (1988) was ﬁrst to emphasize the welfarist postulate that underlies axiomatic
bargaining theory. His reconstruction of the theory on economic environments is not that
informative, because the CONRAD property that he introduces to that eﬀect turns out
to be equivalent to, and probably even more diﬃcult to interpret than, the property of
welfarism itself. Roemer concludes that his reconstruction of bargaining theory demon-
strates “the lengths to which one must go to preserve the axiomatic characterization of
the standard bargaining mechanisms on economic environments” (Roemer (1988), page
30), but the complexity of one reconstruction does not necessarily imply that there are no
more straightforward alternative routes. A major diﬀerence between our two approaches
is that IPUA does not characterize C-WELF. Instead it is weaker, and easier to interpret.
It is only when combined with Nash’s other axioms (especially IIA) that one obtains C-
WELF. As a corollary, my reconstruction is also less ambitious, since it is not guaranteed
that every axiomatic result in bargaining theory can be recovered in economic environ-
ments by adding IPUA. Example 2 in Section 4, for instance, shows that replacing Nash’s
independence property by Kalai and Smorodinsky’s (1975) restricted monotonicity prop-
erty does not characterize their cardinal welfarist solution when bargaining over only one
good. On the other hand, Theorem 2 proves that the characterization result holds when
5Implementation results that involve nonfeasible outcomes out of equilibrium are often seen as unap-
pealing (see for instance Demange’s (1984) criticism of Crawford (1979) procedure for generating Pareto
eﬃcient egalitarian allocations.
6The Nash program is sometimes understood in a broader sense, allowing the equilibrium of the non-
cooperative procedure to depend on some additional features such as the bargainers’ discount factors.
Though I am not aware of a speciﬁc example, I suppose it is possible to implement in this broader sense
a solution that does not satisfy IPUA.
7On the other hand, the bargainers’ risk attitudes play a crucial role in determining the Nash bar-
gaining solution in non-elementary problems.
6allowing for multiple goods. My results also rely heavily on the use of lotteries and von
Neumann-Morgenstern preferences, while Roemer worked with concave utility functions
deﬁned over deterministic outcomes.
Rubinstein et al. (1992) is another important paper on axiomatic bargaining in ex-
plicit environments. They emphasized the ordinal character of the Nash bargaining so-
lution, as I do here. There are two main diﬀerences though. First, the corner-stone of
their characterization is an axiom of independence with respect to changes in preferences
that is far stronger than IPUA. They call it a property of IIA, because the changes in
preferences involved do imply a contraction of the set of utilities as in Nash’s IIA, but
obvioulsy it is diﬀerent from the usual interpretation of Nash’s IIA axiom which involves
changes in the set of available agreements (the set of feasible agreements is indeed ﬁxed
throughout Rubinstien et al.’s paper).8 Their result develops an interesting alternative
interpretation and characterization of the Nash bargaining solution, in the tradition of
Zeuthen’s (1930) idea of concession (see also Harsanyi, 1956) and Aumann and Kurz’s
(1977) notion of boldness (see also Burgos et al., 2002). My paper, on the other hand,
shows that Nash’s original result can be accomodated to some natural economic environ-
ments, provided one accepts IPUA. Second, Rubinstein et al.’s axiomatic result involves a
strong symmetry axiom that is harder to interpret than, and that does not follow from, a
principle of anonymity (or equal bargaining abilities). Their symmetry axiom constitutes
in fact a ﬁrst step towards C-WELF, as it implies, in their model, that the image of the
solution in the utility space lies on the 45o-line whenever the image of the bargaining
problem is symmetric (in Nash’s sense) for some linear representation of the players von
Neumann-Morgenstern preferences. I conclude this introduction by observing that Ru-
binstein et al.’s axiomatic characterization is also valid on larger classes of preferences,
allowing for some forms of non-expected utility (see also Grant and Kajii, 1995). I have
not been able so far to adapt my arguments to this more general framework. Investigating
the possibility of such extensions remains an interesting topic for future research. The
related literature will be further discussed in Section 5.
2. DEFINITIONS
Let L be the set of goods. A bargaining problem is a triple (O,1,2), where O ⊆ RL
+×RL
+
is the compact9 set of available outcomes that specify a bundle for each bargainer, and
8This illustrates again that working in the space of utilities may be misleading when it comes to
interpreting the axioms.
9O can be ﬁnite or inﬁnite. All the results of the paper remain true if one restricts the domain to
bargaining problems with a ﬁnite set O of outcomes.
7i is player i’s preference relation deﬁned over ∆(RL
+),10 the set of simple11 lotteries
over RL
+ (i = 1,2). The bargainers receive no good if they do not reach an agreement,
and I assume throughout the paper that the bargainers can agree to implement the
disagreement outcome, i.e. (0,0) ∈ O. I also assume that there exists µ ∈ ∆(O) such
that µ i 0, for both i = 1,2. Otherwise, the problem is easy to solve by applying an
argument of eﬃciency. The bargainers’ preferences are assumed to be strictly increasing
(i.e. o i o0 whenever o ≥ o0 and o 6= o0), and of the von Neumann-Morgenstern (vN-
M) type, meaning that they are complete, transitive, continuous, and satisfy the usual
independence axiom (see e.g. Fishburn (1970, chapter 8) and references therein).
A solution Σ associates to each bargaining problem (O,1,2) a nonempty subset of
lotteries deﬁned over O. Nash’s axioms can easily be rephrased in this economic context.
Observe how their formal statement matches well their usual interpretation, contrarily to
their phrasing in Nash’s cardinal welfarist formulation (as already argued more in detail
in Section 1). The following axioms are assumed to hold for each bargaining problem
(O,1,2).
Pareto Indiﬀerence (PI) If µ and ν both belong to Σ(O,1,2), then µ ∼1 ν and
µ ∼2 ν.
Eﬃciency (EFF) If µ ∈ Σ(O,1,2), then there does not exist ν ∈ ∆(O) such that
ν i µ for both i ∈ {1,2}, and ν i µ for some i ∈ {1,2}.
Anonymity (AN) Let O∗ = {(x,y) ∈ RL
+ × RL
+|(y,x) ∈ O}. For each µ ∈ ∆(O), let
µ∗ ∈ ∆(O∗) be the lottery deﬁned as follows: µ∗(x,y) = µ(y,x), for each (x,y) ∈ O∗.
Then Σ(O,2,1) = {µ∗|µ ∈ Σ(O,1,2)}.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) If µ ∈ Σ(O,1,2), O0 ⊆ O, and
µ ∈ ∆(O0), then µ ∈ Σ(O0,1,2).
PI requires that the solution provides a unique answer to each bargaining problem,
meaning formally that the solution is essentially single-valued. There can be multiple
lotteries in the solution of a problem only if both bargainers are indiﬀerent between all of
them. Nash imposed this type of restriction in the very deﬁnition of a solution, by focusing
on functions instead of correspondences. I prefer to formulate it as an explicit axiom,
drawing attention to the fact that unicity in the space of utilities does not necessarily
imply unicity in the underlying economic environment. EFF guarantees that the solution
makes the most out of the feasibility constraints faced by the two bargainers: there is no
alternative contract that would make both of them at least as well oﬀ, and at least one
10Bargainers are thus assumed to be selﬁsh, caring only about the bundle they will consume.
11i.e. with ﬁnite support.
8of them strictly better oﬀ. Anonymity requires that the solution does not depend on the
identity of the bargainers. Formally, if we exchange the identity of the two bargainers,
then the solution should change accordingly. It is thus assumed, as a benchmark, that the
two players have equal bargaining abilities. Nash imposed a slightly weaker property of
symmetry, namely that the solution should be symmetric if the problem itself is symmetric
(i.e. O∗ = O and 1=2 in the present framework). The motivation behind the two
axioms is the same though. As for IIA, suppose that the bargainers recognize that the
lottery µ ∈ ∆(O) is a reasonable agreement for the problem (O,1,2). Suppose now
they learn that less alternatives are available, in that they must agree on a lottery over
O0 ⊆ O, but that µ is still feasible, i.e. µ ∈ ∆(O0). It is then assumed that the bargainers
will recognize that µ0 is a reasonable agreement for the problem (O0,1,2) as well.
3. MAIN RESULT
PI, EFF, AN, and IIA are far from characterizing a unique solution. By PI, a solution
determines a unique indiﬀerence class for each bargaining problem, but one may construct
many solutions by selecting diﬀerent subsets of feasible lotteries that belong to that class.
The next axiom rules out such multiplicity, by requiring the solution to be exhaustive.
Exhaustivity (EX) Let ν ∈ ∆(O) and µ ∈ Σ(O,1,2). If µ ∼1 ν and µ ∼2 ν, then
ν ∈ Σ(O,1,2).
The axiom is very convincing if the bargainers care only about fulﬁlling their preferences,
as usually assumed in economics. Suppose that the bargainers recognize that the lottery
µ ∈ ∆(O) is a reasonable compromise for the problem (O,1,2). Suppose also that
both bargainers are indiﬀerent between µ and another lottery ν ∈ ∆(O). EX then
assumes that the bargainers would recognize ν as another reasonable compromise for
that problem.
EX is reminiscent of Sen’s (1977, 1979) notion of welfarism (even though such state-
ment is necessarily fuzzy, since Sen is concerned with social welfare orderings, while I
study bargaining solutions). Sen argues that indiﬀerence on the part of all the society
members does not necessarily imply social indiﬀerence when comparing alternatives. In
such cases, the social comparison is based on some information that goes beyond the mere
deﬁnition of individuals’ preferences, and a fortiori utilities. One could reject EX on sim-
ilar ground. For instance, two bargainers may be indiﬀerent between a non-degenerate
lottery µ and a deterministic outcome in the solution of a problem, but nevertheless con-
sider that µ is not a reasonable compromise, on the basis that lotteries should be avoided
9whenever possible. While it is possible to adapt the axioms appearing in Theorem 1 below
to accomodate this kind of solution, I will simply rule them out by assuming EX. First I
think that EX is more reasonable in bargaining theory than in social choice. Second, the
main focus of the present paper is on Roemer’s notion of welfarism, as discussed in the
Introduction and formalized by C-WELF in Section 5, which deserves careful attention
even when assuming EX.
There are still many solutions that satisfy PI, EFF, AN, IIA, and EX. Here is a class
of such solutions that share some similarity with the concept of egalitarian equivalence
introduced by Pazner and Schmeidler (1978).
Example 1 Let (O,1,2) be a bargaining problem, and let d ∈ RL
++. For each µ ∈
∆(O), let αd
i(µ) be the unique real number such that i is indiﬀerent between the lottery
µ and receiving αd
i(µ)dl units of each good l, for sure. Let ˆ αd(µ) be the vector in R2
+
obtained by rearranging the components of αd(µ) increasingly. The egalitarian equivalent
solution Σd
EE is obtained by maximizing ˆ αd according to the lexicographic order. It is not
diﬃcult to check that Σd
EE satisﬁes PI, EX, AN, EFF, and IIA. Notice that multiplying
d by a scalar does not change the solution. There is thus a unique egalitarian equivalent
solution when L = 1, the vector α(µ) determining the certainty equivalent of µ for both
bargainers. The solution varies with the direction d when L ≥ 2.
I now introduce the property that will play a key role in establishing the main result.
Independence of Preference between Unfeasible Alternatives (IPUA) Let (O,1
,2)) and (O,0
1,0
2)) be two bargaining problems. If µ i ν if and only if µ 0
i ν, for
each µ,ν ∈ ∆({x ∈ RL




The two bargaining problems in IPUA diﬀer only in the bargainers’ perferences over
options that are not available. It is then required that the solutions of these two problems
coincide. IPUA has already been discussed in the Introduction, and will be further
discussed in Section 5.
The proof of the main result requires one last axiom.
Strong Individual Rationality (SIR) Let (O,1,2) be a bargaining problem. Then
µ 1 0 and µ 2 0, for each µ ∈ Σ(O,1,2).
Agreements are always individually rational in the model I consider, since the disagree-
ment outcome is the worst alternative. EFF already guarantees that the solution does
not include the disagreement outcome (remember that there are some agreements that
can make both bargainers better oﬀ than with the disagreement outcome). SIR rules out
10in addition solutions that give the disagreement outcome to one bargainer and a lottery
that is strictly better than the disagreement outcome to the other bargainer. Indeed, this
would clearly not constitute a compromise of the bargainers’ opposing interests.
Theorem 1 There exists a unique solution Σ that satisﬁes PI, EFF, AN, IIA, EX, IPUA,
and SIR. It is computed as follows:
Σ(O,1,2) = arg max
µ∈∆(O)
(U1(µ) − U1(0))(U2(µ) − U2(0)),
where Ui : ∆(RL
+) → R is any12 linear representation of the vN-M preferences i (i =
1,2).
The solution derived from the axioms in Theorem 1 is simply the reformulation of
the Nash bargaining solution in our economic environment. It will thus be denoted by
ΣN in the remainder of the paper. Observe that the use of linear representations of the
preferences follows from the axioms, instead of being assumed in the model and the ax-
ioms themselves. Theorem 1 will appear to be a consequence of two lemmas. I need to
introduce one last axiom to state them.
Equal Probabilities in Elementary Problems (EPEP) Let O = {(0,0),(x,0),(0,y)},




A bargaining problem is elementary if the feasible outcomes are either full disagreement,
a bundle x for the ﬁrst bargainer and the disagreement outcome for the second bargainer,
or a bundle y for the second bargainer and the disagreement outcome for the ﬁrst bar-
gainer. EPEP requires that the solution places equal probabilities on (x,0) and (0,y),
independently of what x, y and the bargainers’ preferences are. We will see in Lemma
2 that this property that may seem a bit arbitrary for the moment is in fact implied by
the axioms listed in Theorem 1. First I show that it is suﬃcient, in combination with PI,
IIA, and EX, to characterize the Nash bargaining solution.
Lemma 1 ΣN is the only solution that satisﬁes PI, IIA, EX, and EPEP.
Proof: The fact that ΣN satisﬁes the axioms follows from the usual properties of the
Nash bargaining solution deﬁned in the space of utilities. I will thus focus on proving
uniqueness. Let Σ be a solution that satisﬁes the axioms, let (O,1,2) be a bargaining
12 If two diﬀerent sets of linear utility functions (U1,U2) and (V1,V2) represent (1,2), then there
exists α ∈ R2
+ and β ∈ R2 such that Ui = αiVi + βi, for i = 1,2. Hence argmaxµ∈∆(O)(U1(µ) −
U1(0))(U2(µ) − U2(0)) = argmaxµ∈∆(O)(V1(µ) − V1(0))(V2(µ) − V2(0)), and the solution is thus well-
deﬁned.






for some (or each, by PI) µ ∈ ΣN(O,1,2). Notice that both σ∗
1 and σ∗
2 must be strictly
positive. Let
U = {(U1(µ),U2(µ))|µ ∈ ∆(O)}, and
V = {x ∈ R





The sets U and V are both convex, and U∩V = {σ∗}. The separating hyperplane theorem
implies that










because the gradient of the function (x1 − U1(0))(x2 − U2(0)) at σ∗ is proportional
to (σ∗
2 − U2(0),σ∗
1 − U1(0)). Hence U is included in the triangle with extreme points
(U1(0),U2(0)), (2σ∗
1 − U1(0),U2(0)), and (U1(0),2σ∗
2 − U2(0)). Let ﬁnally xi ∈ RL
+
be such that Ui(xi) = 2σ∗
i − Ui(0), and let O0 = O ∪ {(x1,0),(0,x2)}. Notice that
U0 = {(U1(µ),U2(µ))|µ ∈ ∆(O0)} coincides with the triangle whose extreme points are
(U1(0),U2(0)), (U1(x1),U2(0)), and (U1(0),U2(x2)). Let µ0 ∈ Σ(O0,1,2). There must
exist α,β ∈ [0,1] such that (U1(µ0),U2(µ0)) = α(U1(0),U2(0)) + β(U1(x1),U1(0)) + (1 −
α − β)(U2(0),U2(x2)). EX implies that the lottery that gives (0,0) with probability α,
(x1,0) with probability β, and (0,x2) with probability 1−α−β belongs to Σ(O0,1,2).
IIA implies that this lottery also belongs to Σ({(0,0),(0,x2),(x1,0)},1,2). EPEP
implies that α = 0 and β = 1/2. Hence Ui(µ0) = σ∗
i, for both i = 1,2. This implies
that µ ∈ Σ(O0,1,2), by EX, and that µ ∈ Σ(O,1,2), by IIA. I just proved that
ΣN ⊆ Σ. PI implies that Σ = ΣN. 
Lemma 1 is not without interest on its own. First, it oﬀers a characterization of the
Nash bargaining solution for a ﬁxed proﬁle of vN-M preferences. IPUA and the main
axiom of Rubinstein and al. (1992), on the contrary, involve comparisons of bargaining
problems with diﬀerent preferences. Second, while examples of elementary problems
have been used in the past to discuss the general appeal of the Nash and the Kalai-
Smorodinsky bargaining solutions (see Roth, 1979, pages 67-70; Roemer, 1996, Section
2.5), it has not been observed that the general property underlying these examples, as
captured by EPEP, is in fact strong enough in itself to characterize the Nash bargaining
solution when combined with the economic reformulation of Nash’s axioms. Finally,
12observe that Lemma 1 is reminiscent of Myerson’s (1984) characterization of a generalized
Nash bargaining solution for environments with incomplete information, as his random
dictatorship axiom is closely related to (and immediately implies) EPEP. I now prove
that the axioms listed in Theorem 1 together imply EPEP.
Lemma 2 PI, EFF, AN, IIA, EX, IPUA, and SIR together imply EPEP.
Proof: By EFF, any lottery in the solution of the problem described in EPEP must
give (0,y) with some probability α, and (x,0) with probability 1 − α. I prove now that
α = 1/2.
Suppose ﬁrst that y = x. AN implies that (1−α)(0,x)⊕α(x,0) belongs to Σ(O∗,2
,1). Notice that the preference orderings i and −i coincide on ∆({0,x}). Hence
(1 − α)(0,x) ⊕ α(x,0) belongs to Σ(O∗,1,2), by IPUA, or to Σ(O,1,2), since
O∗ = O. PI implies that α = 1/2.
Suppose now that y 6= x.13 Hence there exists π ∈ RL
++ such that π · x > π · y or
π·y > π·x.14 I will assume that the former inequality holds - a similar argument applies
in the other case. SIR implies that α ∈]0,1[. Let β ∈]0,min{α,1−α}[. Let u2(z) = π·z,
for all z ∈ RL
++, let a ∈ RL
++ be such that π · a = (1 − β)π · y, and let b ∈ RL
++ be such
that π · b = βπ · y. Let then u1 : RL
++ → R be the continuous and strictly increasing
function deﬁned as follows:
u1(z) =
(
π · z if π · z ≤ π · a
π · a +
π·(y−a)
π·(x−a)π · (z − a) if π · z ≥ π · a
Let 0
i be the preference ordering on ∆(RL
+) derived through the expected utility criterion
applied to the Bernoulli function ui. Observe that 0
1 coincides with 1 on ∆({0,x}), and
that 0
2 coincides with 2 on ∆({0,y}). IPUA implies that the lottery that gives (x,0)
with probability 1−α and (0,y) with probability α belongs to Σ({(0,0),(x,0),(0,y)},0
1
,0
2). Let ν ∈ Σ({(0,0),(x,0),(0,y),(a,b),(b,a)},0
1,0
2). EFF implies that ν((0,0)) =
0. For any γ ∈ [0,1], both agents are indiﬀerent given (0
1,0
2) between the lottery that
gives (a,b) with probability γ and (b,a) with probability 1−γ, and the lottery that gives
(x,0) with probability β + γ − 2βγ and (0,y) with probability 1 − β − γ + 2βγ. Hence
both bargainers must be indiﬀerent between ν and some lottery in ∆({(x,0),(0,y)}).
This lottery must belong to Σ({(0,0),(x,0),(0,y),(a,b),(b,a)},0
1,0
2), by EX, and IIA
13This is the diﬃcult part of the proof, where one can fully appreciate the diﬀerence between anonymity
and Nash’s cardinal welfarist property of symmetry.
14The proof might be easier to understand at ﬁrst when L = 1, in which case π can be normalized to
1.
13implies that it also belong Σ({(0,0),(x,0),(0,y)},0
1,0
2). PI thus implies that the lot-
tery that gives (0,y) with probability α and (x,0) with probability 1 − α belongs to
Σ({(0,0),(x,0),(0,y),(a,b),(b,a)},0
1,0
2). Both bargainers are indiﬀerent given (0
1,0
2





1−2β (these are well-deﬁned probabilities because β < min{α,1−α} <
1/2). EX implies that this new lottery belongs to Σ({(0,0),(x,0),(0,y),(a,b),(b,a)},0
1
,0
2), and hence also to Σ({(0,0),(a,b),(b,a)},0
1,0
2), by IIA. Notice that 0
1 coincides
with 0
2 on ∆({0,a,b}) (π · b < π · a because β < 1/2). AN and PI imply that the
only element of Σ({(0,0),(a,b),(b,a)},0
1,0
2) is the lottery that puts an equal weight
on (a,b) and on (b,a) (similar to the argument that showed that α = 1/2 when y = x in
the previous paragraph). Hence
α−β
1−2β = 1/2, or α = 1/2. 
Proof of Theorem 1: The fact that ΣN is the only candidate to satisfy the axioms follow
from Lemmas 1 and 2. The well-known properties of the Nash bargaining solution in the
space of utilities implies at once that ΣN satisﬁes PI, EFF, AN, IIA, EX, and SIR. So all
what remains to do is check that it also satisﬁes IPUA. Let Ui (resp. Vi) be a linear repre-
sentation of i (resp. 0
i). If i coincides with 0
i on ∆(O), then there exists λ ∈ R+ and
α ∈ R such that Ui(·) = λVi(·)+α on ∆(O) (usual argument on equivalent linear represen-
tations of vN-M preferences applied to ∆(O)). Hence ΣN(O,1,2) = ΣN(O,0
1,0
2),
as in IPUA. 
The rest of this section is devoted to showing the independence of the axioms ap-
pearing in Theorem 1 and Lemma 1. Consider ﬁrst the solution that is determined by
EPEP on elementary problems, and that associates to any other bargaining problem the
set of lotteries that are Pareto optimal and strictly individually rational. It satisﬁes all
the axioms listed in both Theorem 1 and Lemma 1, except PI. The Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution, discussed at length in the next section, satisﬁes all the axioms listed in Theorem
1 and Lemma 1, except IIA. The solution(s) deﬁned in Example 1 satisﬁes all the axioms
listed in Theorem 1, except IPUA, and all the axioms from Lemma 1, except EPEP. The
weighted Nash solutions satisfy all the axioms of Theorem 1, except AN. It also satisﬁes
all the axioms of Lemma 1, except EPEP. The modiﬁed Nash solution that selects de-
terministic outcomes in ΣN whenever possible, i.e. ˜ ΣN(O,1,2) = ΣN(O,1,2) ∩ O,
if this set is nonempty, and ˜ ΣN(O,1,2) = ΣN(O,1,2), otherwise, satisﬁes all the
axioms from both Theorem 1 and Lemma 1, except EX. I have not been able to show
the independence of EFF and SIR from the other axioms in Theorem 1, but it is easy to
see that at least one of them is needed since the solution that always selects the origin
satisﬁes all the axioms listed in that theorem, except EFF and SIR.
144. THE KALAI-SMORODINSKY SOLUTION
IIA is the axiom that has most often been criticized in Nash’s model. Although it
is undeniable that arguments along the lines of IIA are heard in real-life bargaining,
it is not clear that they are systematically followed. Suppose for instance that O0 is
obtained from O by removing exclusively alternatives that are very favorable to the ﬁrst
bargainer. In such cases, the second bargainer may have a valid argument against IIA,
because the reduction from O to O0 seems to place the ﬁrst bargainer in a weaker position.
The main alternative cardinal welfarist solution that emerged from this criticism was
proposed by Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975). They propose to replace IIA by a property
of monotonicity that applies only when the bargainers’ utopia points remain unchanged.15
In this section, I investigate whether EPEP or IPUA can be used in combination with
the natural economic reformulation of Kalai and Smorodinsky’s axioms to characterize
their solution.
I start by redeﬁning the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and the property of conditional
monotonicity in my economic framework:





maxν∈∆(O) Ui(ν) − Ui(0)
,
where (U1,U2) is any16 linear representation of the vN-M preferences (1,2).
Conditional Monotonicity (C-MON) Let (O,1,2) be a bargaining problem, and O0
be a set larger than O. If there is no µ0 ∈ ∆(O0) such that either µ0 1 µ or µ0 2 µ
for all µ ∈ ∆(O), then for all µ ∈ Σ(O,1,2) there exists µ0 ∈ Σ(O0,1,2) such that
µ0 1 µ and µ0 2 µ.17
It is not diﬃcult to check that the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution satisﬁes both EPEP
and IPUA. On the other hand, the uniqueness result derived in Theorem 1 and Lemma
1 is not always guaranteed when IIA is replaced by C-MON, as the following example
shows.
Example 2 Consider ﬁrst the economic reformulation of the solutions characterized by
Peters and Tijs (1985). Let φ : [1,2] → conv{(1,0),(0,1),(1,1)} that is continuous,
non-decreasing and such that φ(1) = (1/2,1/2) and φ(2) = (1,1). The function φ thus
15Kalai and Smorodinsky’s property of monotonicity implies a weak form of IIA that applies only
when the bargainers’ utopia points remain unchanged, hence addressing to some extent the criticism
formulated against IIA.
16See Footnote 12.
17The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution also satisﬁes a stronger monotonicity property requiring that µ0 1
µ and µ0 2 µ, for all µ ∈ Σ(O,1,2) and all µ0 ∈ Σ(O0,1,2).
15determines a monotonic curve in the subset conv{(1,0),(0,1),(1,1)} of the utility space.
Let then Σφ be the solution that associates to each bargaining problem (O,1,2) the






i is the unique linear representation of i such that U∗
i (0) = 0 and
maxo∈O U∗
i (o) = 1. It is not diﬃcult to check that Σφ is well-deﬁned, and satisﬁes PI,
EFF, C-MON, EX, and EPEP, but is diﬀerent from ΣKS as soon as φ(t) 6= (t/2,t/2),
for some t ∈]1,2[. This shows that the uniqueness result in Lemma 1 does not hold when
IIA is replaced by C-MON. Still, all these solutions are cardinal welfarist, and the Kalai-
Smorodinsky is the only member of that family that is anonymous. I now propose a more
intricate example that shows that uniqueness cannot be recovered in Theorem 1, even if
one adds the requirement of anonymity. Let x and y be two bundles on the diagonal of
RL
+ such that U∗
1(x) = U∗
2(y) = 1. Consider then the monotonic curve in the triangle





x1+y1) until it reaches an edge of the triangle, in which case it continues
until (1,1) on that edge. Let ψ be the functional description of that curve, i.e. ψ(t) is the
intersection of the curve with the line u1 + u2 = t, for each t ∈ [1,2]. It is not diﬃcult
to check that Σψ is well-deﬁned, and satisﬁes PI, EFF, C-MON, EX, EPEP, and AN,
but is diﬀerent from ΣKS. The diﬀerence with the ﬁrst part of the example is that the
curve ψ is deﬁned endogenously, as x and y may thus vary with the bargaining problem
under consideration. The resulting solution is anonymous and non-welfarist. Notice that
this new solution also satisﬁes IPUA and SIR when L = 1, thereby showing that the
uniqueness result of Theorem 1 does not systematically hold either when IIA is replaced
by IPUA. On the other hand, the solution violates IPUA when L ≥ 2 (because x and y
do not need to be part of feasible alternatives). It turns out that this is not a coincidence:
replacing IIA by C-MON characterizes the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution when L ≥ 2, as the
following theorem shows. The theorem also shows that the content of Lemma 1 remains
true if IIA is replaced by C-MON and L ≥ 2. On the other hand, this variant of Lemma
1 would now be useless to prove the next theorem, since there is no equivalent to Lemma
2 with C-MON instead of IIA, as illustrated by Σψ when L ≥ 2.
Theorem 2 ΣKS is the only solution that satisﬁes PI, EFF, AN, C-MON, EX, IPUA,
and SIR if L ≥ 2.
Proof: The fact that ΣKS satisﬁes the axioms follows from the usual properties of the
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution deﬁned in the space of utilities. I will thus focus on proving
uniqueness. Let Σ be a solution that satisﬁes the axioms, let (O,1,2) be a bargaining
problem, let λ ∈ ΣKS(O,1,2), and let (U1,U2) be two linear representations of (1
16,2). Notice that
U1(λ) − U1(0)
maxµ∈∆(O) U1(µ) − U1(0)
=
U2(λ) − U2(0)
maxµ∈∆(O) U2(µ) − U2(0)
. (1)
Suppose on the contrary that one of the two ratios, let’s say the one on the left-hand
side, is strictly smaller than the other one. Let x be an element of O such that U1(x) =
maxµ∈∆(O) U1(µ). Then the lottery that picks x with probability , and λ with probability
1−, guarantees a larger minimal ratio if  is small enough, thereby contradicting the fact
that λ ∈ ΣKS(O,1,2). This establishes equation (1). Let ρ be this common number.
Let x,y, ¯ x, ¯ y be strictly positive bundles (not necessarily in O) such that U1(¯ x) =
U1(λ), U2(¯ y) = U2(λ), U1(x) = maxµ∈∆(O) U1(µ), U2(y) = maxµ∈∆(O) U2(µ), x >> ¯ x, and
y >> ¯ y. The four vectors can, for instance, be taken on the diagonal of RL
+. Let o ∈ O
be such that U1(o) = maxµ∈∆(O) U1(µ). Let x0 be an element on the diagonal that falls
above o. Monotonicity implies that x0 1 µ, for all µ ∈ ∆(O). Continuity implies that
there exist a convex combinations between 0 (the worst element of O) and x0 that will
leave the ﬁrst bargainer indiﬀerent when comparing it to o. Let’s call x this new bundle.
Since U1(λ) ≤ U1(x), there exists a convex combination between x and 0 that will leave
the ﬁrst bargainer indiﬀerent when comparing it to λ. Let’s call ¯ x this new bundle. A
similar construction leads to y and ¯ y. Clearly, x ≤ ¯ x and y ≤ ¯ y. If both inequalities are
binding, then any eﬃcient lottery in ∆(O) gives the same expected utility as λ, and we
are done proving that Σ(O,1,2) = ΣKS(O,1,2). On the other hand, it cannot be
that only one of the two inequalities are binding, by (1), and hence I can assume in the
rest of the proof that both inequalities are strict.
Let  be a strictly positive number, and let ξ be the vector in RL deﬁned as follows:
(∀l ≥ 3) : ξl = min{xl,yl},
ξ1 =
1
1 − 2[y1 − 
2x1 + (y2 − x2) + 
L X
i=3
















Let ¯ ξ be the vector derived by applying the same equations to (¯ x, ¯ y). It is easy to check
that all the components of both ξ and ¯ ξ are strictly positive and that ξ > ¯ ξ, if  is
chosen small enough. Indeed, the limit of ¯ ξ1 (resp. ¯ ξ2) when  tends to zero is ¯ y1 > 0
17(resp. ¯ x2 > 0), the limit of ξ1 − ¯ ξ1 (resp. ξ2 − ¯ ξ2) when  tends to zero is y1 − ¯ y1 > 0
(resp. x2 − ¯ x2 > 0), and the inequalities regarding the other components are obvious.




ξl = y1 + 
L X
l=2
yl and ¯ ξ1 + 
L X
l=2







ξl = x2 + 
L X
l=1,l6=2
xl and ¯ ξ2 + 
L X
l=1,l6=2




In other words, ξ (resp. ¯ ξ) has been chosen in the intersection of the hyperplane of normal
(1,,...,) that goes through y (resp. ¯ y) and the hyperplane of normal (,1,,...,) that
goes through x (resp. ¯ x).18
Let f : R+ → R be a continuous, unbounded and strictly increasing function such
that f(0) = 0, f(
PL
l=1 ¯ ξl) = ρ, and f(
PL
l=1 ξl) = 1. Let then v(z) = f(
PL
l=1 zl), for each
z ∈ RL
+, and 0 be the vN-M preference on ∆(RL
+) derived by applying the expected utility
criterion to v. I now prove that AN and EFF imply that (¯ ξ, ¯ ξ) ∈ Σ(O0,0,0), where
O0 = {(0,0),(ξ,0),(0,ξ),(¯ ξ, ¯ ξ)}. Let µ ∈ Σ(O0,0,0). EFF implies that µ((0,0)) = 0.
AN implies that µ∗ ∈ Σ(O0,0,0). PI implies that µ((ξ,0)) = µ((0,ξ)). Notice that
ρ ≥ 1/2. If ρ = 1/2, then then both bargainers are indiﬀerent between (¯ ξ, ¯ ξ) and the
lottery that gives (ξ,0) and (0,ξ) with equal probabilities. There are multiple lotteries
in Σ(O0,0,0), and EX implies that (¯ ξ, ¯ ξ) ∈ Σ(O0,0,0). If ρ > 1/2, then EFF implies
that µ((ξ,0)) = µ((0,ξ)) = 0, and one concludes again that (¯ ξ, ¯ ξ) ∈ Σ(O0,0,0), as
desired.
Let now g1 : R+ → R and g2 : R+ → R be two continuous, unbounded and strictly in-
creasing functions such that g1(0) = g2(0) = 0, g1(¯ x2+
PL
l=1,l6=2 ¯ xl) = g2(¯ y1+
PL
l=2 ¯ yl) =
ρ, and g1(x2+
PL
l=1,l6=2 xl) = g2(y1+
PL
l=2 yl) = 1. Let also w1(z) = g1(z2+
PL
l=1,l6=2 zl)
and w2(z) = g2(z1+
PL
l=2 zl), for each z ∈ RL
+. Let ﬁnally 00
i be the vN-M preference on
∆(RL
+) derived by applying the expected utility criterion to wi (i = 1,2). In other words,
00
1 (resp. 00
2) has indiﬀerence curves along the hyperplanes of normal (,1,,...,) (resp.
(1,,...,)), and is such that agent 1 (resp. 2) remains indiﬀerent between getting ¯ ξ for
sure and playing the lottery that gives him ξ, with probability ρ, and 0, with probability
1 − ρ. Notice that 00
i coincides with 0 on ∆({0,ξ, ¯ ξ}), because wi(o) = v(o), for each
18It might be easier to focus on the case L = 2 when reading the proof for the ﬁrst time. Notice
that the construction of ξ and ¯ ξ necessitates at least two goods. We know from the Example 2 that the
Theorem itself does not hold when L = 1.
18i ∈ {1,2} and each o ∈ {0,ξ, ¯ ξ}, and hence (¯ ξ, ¯ ξ) ∈ Σ(O0,00
1,00
2), by IPUA.
Let O00 = {(0,0),(x,0),(0,y),(¯ x, ¯ y)}. Notice that if µ 00
1 ¯ ξ and µ 00
2 ¯ ξ, then µ ∼00
1 ¯ ξ
and µ ∼00
2 ¯ ξ, for each µ ∈ ∆(O0∪O00). We also have that ¯ x ∼00
1 ¯ ξ and ¯ y ∼00
2 ¯ ξ. C-MON and
EX thus imply that (¯ x, ¯ y) ∈ Σ(O0 ∪ O00,00
1,00
2). A similar argument also implies that
(¯ x, ¯ y) ∈ Σ(O00,00
1,00
2).19 Observe that 00
1 coincides with 1 on ∆({0,x, ¯ x}). Indeed,
renormalizing U1 by substracting Ui(0) and rescaling it by dividing by maxµ∈∆(O) U1(µ)−
U1(0), one obtains an alternative Bernoulli function that also represents 1, and that
coincides with w1 on {0,x, ¯ x}. Similarly, 00
2 coincides with 2 on ∆({0,y, ¯ y}). IPUA
thus implies that (¯ x, ¯ y) ∈ Σ(O00,1,2). Notice now that if µ 1 ¯ x and µ 2 ¯ y, then
µ ∼1 ¯ x and µ ∼2 ¯ y, for each µ ∈ ∆(O ∪ O00). We also have that λ ∼1 ¯ x and λ ∼2 ¯ y.
C-MON and EX thus imply that λ ∈ Σ(O∪O00,1,2). A similar argument also implies
that λ ∈ Σ(O,1,2). Hence ΣKS ⊆ Σ, and PI implies that Σ in fact coincides with
ΣKS. 
I now discuss the independence of the axioms appearing in Theorem 2. Let (O,1,2)
be a bargaining problem, and let oi be an element of O such that Ui(oi) = maxµ∈∆(O) U1(µ).
The solution that selects all the lotteries that are Pareto eﬃcient and weakly preferred
to the lottery that selects o1 and o2 with equal probabilities satisﬁes all the axioms of
Theorem 2, except PI. The solutions Σφ introduced at the beginning of Example 2 sat-
isfy all the axioms, except AN. The Nash bargaining solution studied in the previous
section satisﬁes all the axioms, except C-MON. The modiﬁed Kalai-Smorodinsky solu-
tion that selects deterministic outcomes in ΣKS whenever possible, i.e. ˜ ΣKS(O,1,2
) = ΣKS(O,1,2) ∩ O, if this set is nonempty, and ˜ ΣKS(O,1,2) = ΣKS(O,1,2),
otherwise, satisﬁes all the axioms, except EX. Finally, the solution that always selects
the origin satisﬁes all the axioms, except EFF and SIR.
5. RELATED LITERATURE
Roemer’s (1988) and Rubinstein et al.’s (1992) papers have already been partly dis-
cussed in the Introduction, and I will not repeat the points that I have already raised
there. On the other hand, I want to make the comparison with Nash (1950) more for-
mal, especially to understand precisely what is the diﬀerence between the properties of
welfarism and cardinal welfarism.
19More generally, C-MON implies that IIA holds for any pair (O,1,2) and (O0,1,2) of bargaining
problems as in the statement of IIA, and such that there is no µ ∈ ∆(O) for which either µ 1 µ0 or
µ 2 µ0 for all µ0 ∈ ∆(O0).
19Comparison with Nash (1950)
Rephrasing Nash’s original argument in my framework essentially amounts to replace
EPEP or IPUA by an axiom of welfarism in both Theorem 1 and Lemma 1 (AN and
EFF must be added in the former case, and SIR can be deleted in the latter). Generally
speaking, welfarism is taken in Roemer’s sense (not Sen’s - see footnote 1) that the
image of the bargaining problems in the space of utilities is suﬃcient to determine their
solutions. I want to make this statement precise now.
Even though vN-M preferences can be represented by linear utility functions, there
is no reason a priori to focus on such representations when formulating the welfarist
property. Expected utility theory is indeed an ordinal theory of preference over lotteries.
A utility function U : ∆(RL
+) → R represents a player’s preference relation  over ∆(RL
+)
if µ  ν is equivalent to U(µ) ≥ U(ν), for each µ and each ν in ∆(RL
+). The function
obtained through a strictly increasing transformation of a utility function that represents
a vN-M preference relation  of the expected utility type gives another utility function
that represents it as well. Of course, the property of being linear in probabilities is
usually not preserved under such transformations. The formal deﬁnition of welfarism in
my framework should thus go as follows.
Welfarism (WELF) Let (O,1,2)) and (O0,0
1,0
2)) be two bargaining problems. Let
U1 (resp. U2; V1; V2) be a utility function that represents 1 (resp. 2; 0
1; 0
2). If
{(U1(µ),U2(µ))|µ ∈ ∆(O)} = {(V1(µ),V2(µ))|µ ∈ ∆(O0)},
then
{(U1(µ),U2(µ))|µ ∈ Σ(O,1,2))} = {(V1(µ),V2(µ))|µ ∈ Σ(O0,0
1,0
2))}.
Welfarism is a strong property, as the following impossibility result shows.
Theorem 3 There is no solution that satisﬁes PI, SIR, and WELF.
Proof: Consider the bargaining problem (O,1,2), where O = {(0,0),(¯ x,0),(0, ¯ x)}
with ¯ x being the bundle that contains 1/L units of each good, and i is the preference
relation on ∆(RL







for each µ ∈ ∆(RL
+) (i.e. expected utility with ui(x) =
P
l∈L xl). Let f : R+ → R+ and







2−y if y ≤ 1
y if y ≥ 1
for each y ∈ R+. Notice that both f and g are strictly increasing. Hence V1(·) = f(U1(·))
represents 1, and V2(·) = g(U2(·)) represents 2.
I now prove that
{(U1(µ),U2(µ))|µ ∈ ∆(O)} = {(V1(µ),V2(µ))|µ ∈ ∆(O)}. (2)
Observe indeed that the set on the left-hand side is the triangle with vertices (0,0),




2−β ≤ 1, for each pair α,β of non-negative numbers that sum up to no more than
1. Conversely, any element (x,y) of the triangle can be obtained as the utility pair under
(V1,V2) of the lottery that gives (¯ x,0) with probability x/(2−x), (0, ¯ x) with probability
2y/(1 + y), and (0,0) with the remaining probability.
Given (2), WELF implies that
{(U1(µ),U2(µ))|µ ∈ Σ(O,1,2)} = {(V1(µ),V2(µ))|µ ∈ Σ(O,1,2)}.
Let µ ∈ Σ(O,1,2). PI implies that U1(µ) = V1(µ). Since f has only two ﬁxed points,
y = 0 or 1, this is possible only if µ((¯ x,0)) = 0 or 1, which contradicts SIR. 
In particular, the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions do not satisfy WELF. This
may sound surprising at ﬁrst since these two solutions are often said to be welfarist. My
point here is that they only satisfy a much weaker form of welfarism that holds only for
those utility functions that are linear in probabilities.
Cardinal Welfarism (C-WELF) Let (O,1,2) and (O0,0
1,0
2) be two bargaining
problems. Let u1 (resp. u2; v1; v2) be a continuous Bernoulli function that allows to
represent 1 (resp. 2; 0
1; 0
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2))}.
The key role of linear representations of vN-M preferences was already clear in Nash’s
paper itself. They are needed to justify the convexity of the utility possibility sets, and to
motivate the scale covariance axiom (instead of covariance with respect to a larger class of
utility transformations). One may thus wonder whether Nash’s result is valid only when
phrased with the help of linear representations, that have the advantage indeed to oﬀer
some cardinal measure of the bargainers’ satisfaction (ratios of utility gains being scale
invariant). If so, then Nash’s claim that his bargaining theory builds on von Neumann
and Morgenstern’s notion of expected utility would be wrong. Instead one would have
to resort to other theories of preferences that are truly cardinal (some such theories are
surveyed in chapter 6 of Fishburn, 1970, but they have not had much of an impact in
economics so far). Fortunately, Theorem 1 and Lemma 1 show on the contrary that
the Nash bargaining solution and its characterization can be phrased in terms of ordinal
vN-M preferences.
Theorem 3 is similar to Shapley’s (1969) result showing that one cannot construct
a single-valued solution in the space of utilities that would be single-valued, strictly
individually rational and covariant with respect to any increasing transformations (as
opposed to only aﬃne transformations). Theorem 3 makes Shapley’s welfarist postulate
explicit, and shows that the result holds even if one restricts attention to vN-M preferences
over lotteries in an explicit economic environment. Some authors have investigated ways
to avoid Shapley’s impossibility result when there are more than two bargainers (Kibris
(2004, 2008), Safra and Samet (2004, 2005)), while keeping the welfarist assumption
that solutions should be deﬁned in the space of utilities. Theorems 1 and 2, as well as
Lemma 1, show that ordinal invariance is not out of reach, even when there are only two
bargainers, provided one drops WELF, a property that has no straightforward motivation
anyway, and one restricts attention to vN-M preferences, which are indeed a cornerstone
of non-cooperative game theory and information economics.
Other authors proposed welfarist extensions of the Nash bargaining solution and
its axiomatic characterization to non-convex utility possibility sets (Conley and Wilkie
(1996), Zhou (1997), and references therein), while imposing some form of scale covari-
ance (instead of ordinal covariance as in the papers cited in the previous paragraph). The
content given to the concept of utility in those papers then becomes even less obvious
than in Nash’s model. Recovering these solutions on some natural class of explicit eco-
nomic environments, if possible, would clarify this. Notice that the economic problems I
describe may have a non-convex image in the utility space even when the bargainers have
22vN-M preferences if one does not restrict attention to linear representations. Of course,
the utility proﬁle corresponding to the solution will usually not maximize the product of
the bargainers’ utility gains, and while diﬀerent representations of the same bargaining
problem will be related by an ordinal transformation, the solution will behave in a way
that is usually not covariant.
IPUA is easier to interpret than C-WELF. First it is phrased directly in terms of
preferences instead of their linear representation. Second, it relates the solutions of
problems that diﬀer only in the bargainers’ preferences over unfeasible alternatives, and
not in the set of available outcomes. IPUA is also logically strictly weaker than C-WELF.
It is easy to check indeed that C-WELF implies IPUA, while the following example shows
that the converse is not true.
Example 3 For simplicity, I will describe a solution for the case L = 1, but there are
multiple ways to extend it to any number of goods. Consider the following function f that
associates an element of ∆(O) to each compact subset O of R2
+. For each x ∈ O, let x∗
be the vector obtained by rearranging its components increasingly. There are at most two
vectors x ∈ O that maximize x∗ according to the lexicographic order. The function f picks
the optimal vector if it is unique, and picks the uniform lottery between the two optimal
vectors otherwise. Let (U1,U2) be linear representations of 1 and 2. For each lottery
µ ∈ ∆(O) and each i ∈ {1,2}, let α
f
i (µ) be the ratio
Ui(µ)−Ui(0)
Ui(f(O))−Ui(0). Let ˆ αf be the vector in
R2
+ obtained by rearranging the components of αf(µ) increasingly. The solution Σ is then
obtained by maximizing αf according to the lexicographic order. It is not diﬃcult to check
that Σ satisﬁes IPUA, but not C-WELF, and that it is well-deﬁned in that the solution
does not change when one chooses a diﬀerent linear representation of the bargainers’ vN-
M preferences. Observe that Σ also satisﬁes PI, EX, AN, and EFF. The way Σ is deﬁned
should make it clear that one can construct many alternative solutions that have similar
properties.
Further Comparison with Roemer’s Reconstruction of Axiomatic Bargaining Theory
I here pursue the discussion of Roemer’s work that I started in the Introduction. It
is important to recognize the role played by the domain of deﬁnition of solutions when
formulating axiomatic results. Particularly, one would not obtain a characterization of
the Nash bargaining solution if CONRAD was replaced by IPUA in Roemer’s paper. Here
are the main diﬀerences between our two papers regarding the deﬁnition of a bargaining
problem. First, instead of restricting attention to economic problems that result from
all the possible reallocations of some collective endowment to be shared, my domain
23includes bargaining problems build on any ﬁnite set of bundles. A stark consequence of
Roemer’s assumption is that every solution satisﬁes IIA in his framework, since an eﬃcient
allocation cannot remain feasible if the total endowment to distribute diminishes. Second,
bargainers can use lotteries to reach an agreement in my model, and these lotteries are
evaluated via vN-M ordinal preferences. Roemer, instead, endows the bargainers with
a concave utility function deﬁned over a set of deterministic contracts. Thus his theory
is still rooted in a notion of utility that is not ordinally invariant (as an increasing
transformation of a concave function is not necessarily concave). Third, my reasoning
works for any ﬁxed number of goods (including the interesting case of only one good),
while Roemer’s argument depends crucially on the possibility of adding goods, thereby
considering a framework with a variable (possibly inﬁnite) number of goods. Overall, I
believe that my framework is closer to Nash’s (1950) original construction of a bargaining
problem, starting with explicit economic bundles instead of his more abstract notion of
‘anticipation.’
Working with utility functions instead of preferences, Roemer still requires an axiom
of scale invariance to recover the Nash bargaining solution. I consider solutions that
are directly deﬁned in terms of the ordinal information encoded in vN-M preferences,
observing in particular that the Nash solution is ordinally invariant. I also introduced the
distinction between welfarism and cardinal welfarism, emphasizing that the Nash solution
satisﬁes only the second (weaker) property. Indeed, welfarism and ordinal invariance are
essentially incompatible (cf. Theorem 3).
Roemer (1996, Section 2.5) suggests the following example as a criticism of both
Nash’s and Kalai-Smorodinsky’s solutions (a similar example was also discussed in Roth
(1979, pages 67-70), but Roemer’s description more directly ﬁts my model). Consider
two risk-neutral bargainers with the following options: either 1) the ﬁrst bargainer gets
a silver dollar, while the second receives nothing, or 2) the ﬁrst bargainer gets nothing,
while the second receives a Rolls Royce, or 3) both bargainers receive nothing. As in
the present paper, Roemer assumes that they can agree on any lottery over these three
basic outcomes, and he observes that any solution that is cardinal welfarist, scale covari-
ant, eﬃcient, and symmetric must lead to an agreement with equal probabilities on the
two ﬁrst options. EPEP extends this example into a formal testable implication, and
Lemma 1 shows that it is in fact characteristic of the Nash bargaining solution under
PI, IIA and EX. Roemer expects, on the other hand, that the agreement will place a
much larger probability on the ﬁrst option occuring in his example.20 The violation of a
20The outcome would be that the second bargainer would get the Rolls Royce with probability 1 if
24testable implication for a speciﬁc bargaining solution does not necessarily diminish the
interest of its axiomatic characterization. Indeed, it forces us to think about which more
fundamental property is not followed by the participants of the experiment.21 Lemma
2 sheds new light on the possible causes for the violation of EPEP. Example 1 provides
a class of solutions where the violation of EPEP goes in pair with a violation of IPUA.
Perhaps more interestingly, if one accepts IPUA and one understands PI, EFF, AN, and
EX as deﬁning a benchmark, then a violation of EPEP must necessarily go in pair with a
violation of IIA.22 As an illustration, the next example provides a class of solutions that
satisfy all the axioms of this paper, except both EPEP and IIA.














The solution that associates to any such bargaining problem P the set of lotteries that
maximize the weighted Nash product with weight w(P) on the ﬁrst bargainer and 1−w(P)
on the second bargainer, satisﬁes all the axioms of the paper, except both EPEP and IIA.
Two Other Related Papers
Valenciano and Zarzuelo’s (1997) preference-based bargaining problem is the combi-
nation of a set X of possible outcomes, a disagreement point, and vN-M preferences over
∆(X). Their main result (see their theorem 4) establishes that C-WELF is equivalent
to a property of invariance to isomorphic transformations in the underlying situations
(after having performed two operations on the basic problems, the ﬁrst one that consists
I happened to play that game once in the shoes of the ﬁrst bargainer. The reason, of course, is some
form of altruism - knowing that somebody would get a free Rolls Royce thanks to my decision is worth
more to me than a dollar. It is thus important to emphasize again that the model I study presumes that
the bargainers are selﬁsh, in that they only care about their own consumption. Extending the results of
this paper to more general classes of preferences is an interesting topic for future research. In any case,
Roemer’s point sounds more plausible if the diﬀerence in value between the two prizes is less dramatic.
Roth (1979) cites indeed some experimental evidence going in that direction.
21It is also possible that experimental subjects are inconsistent in their choices, in that they would
accept the arguments presented in the axioms, but not comply with the predictions of the theory because
they are not aware of the implication of those axioms. In such cases, axiomatic results may have the
value of helping bargainers to solve their inconsistencies.
22It is important to emphasize again the role of the domain: the larger the more powerful IIA becomes.
I already argued that the domain of economic outcomes I chose to work with is both natural and close
to what Nash himself had in mind. Even if not every single bargaining problem in that domain would
necessarily occur, they all remain conceivable and can thus be part of the bargainers’ arguments to reach
an agreement.
25in adding an equivalent outcome for each lottery in the original problem, and the sec-
ond one that consists in restricting attention to equivalence classes deﬁned by the two
players’ indiﬀerence relations). Their framework is close to mine if X is always taken
as a subset of RL
+, except for one crucial diﬀerence. Deﬁning the preferences over ∆(X)
instead of ∆(RL
+) amounts to implicitly assume IPUA in the model itself. Remaining
abstract about what outcomes can be, it seems impractical to even phrase IPUA, as one
would need to deﬁne a priori what are the players’ preferences over any conceivable set
of outcomes. In contrast, I restricted attention to lotteries over economic outcomes, one
of the most natural class of explicit environments. IPUA can now be phrased meaning-
fully. Doing this, one is forced to recognize that imposing such a property is perhaps
not that innocuous after all (e.g. ruling out the principle of egalitarian equivalence, and
overlooking the bargainers’ risk attitude in elementary problems), though some will ﬁnd
it acceptable (e.g. if one believes in the Nash program). IPUA is thus clearly a key
property that provides a deeper understanding of classical axiomatic results in bargain-
ing theory. Contrarily to Valenciano and Zarzuelo, my objective was not to characterize
C-WELF in general, but instead to see how the reformulation of Nash’s axioms can be
complemented to recover his solutions. I proved that IPUA is strong enough in itself.
Particularly, adding a property of ‘invariance to isomorphic transformations’ to the list
of axioms appearing in Theorem 1 would be redundant.
Hanany (2007) revisits Rubinstein et al. (1992) from the perspective of the revealed
group preferences framework of Peters and Wakker (1991). His deﬁnition of a bargaining
problem is similar to mine, making the additional assumption that L = 1, but allowing on
the other hand for a larger class of preferences. One might think that his second theorem
is formally related to my Theorem 1 (the weak axiom of revealed preferences coincides
with IIA under EX and PI). A major diﬀerence though is that Hanany restricts attention
to deterministic agreements (while risk preferences play of course a role in determining
this outcome). The diﬃculty is that such agreements may be dominated by a lottery
(his axiom of eﬃciency rules out the use of lotteries when making Pareto comparisons).
Even if maximizing the Nash product over deterministic outcomes happens to lead to an
agreement that is fully eﬃcient, using lotteries may still result in a better compromise
(think of elementary problems, for instance). Actually the very bargaining problems
that play a key role in Hanany’s proof have this feature. Finally, Hanany relies on the
strong symmetry axiom of Rubinstein et al. (1992) (or actually a small variant that
was proposed by Grant and Kajii, 1995). As already explained in the Introduction, such
property is signiﬁcantly stronger than AN, and is in fact closely related to C-WELF itself.
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